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Corporation Law-Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Delaware
Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers
The evolution of modem, "liberal" corporation acts' has elicited a spir-
ited debate among commentators and practitioners ever since New Jersey en-
acted the first modem liberal corporation act in 1896. Recently, this debate2
has been particularly acute with regard to the propriety of take out mergers3
1. The trend toward liberalization of state corporation acts initially served to meet the grow-
ig needs of corporations in the expanding economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuies. See
generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: R6flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,
663-68 (1974). Early in the 20th century the leading industrial states began to remove the limits
on both the size and powers of corporations. As states realized the potential revenue to be derived
by inducing major corporations to incorporate and locate within their boundaries, this liberaliza-
tion process accelerated. This trend toward liberal corporation acts has been characterized as the
"race to the bottom." Cary, supra, at 666. For general discussions of the history of corporate
statutes, see J. DAviS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917); J.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BusNESs CORI'ORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1780-1970 (1970); Berle, HistoricalInheritance of4merican Corporations, in CONFERENCE ON SO-
CIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS, 3 THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
189 (E. Cahn ed. 1950); Cary, supra; ConardAn Overview of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 621 (1973); Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409
(1968); Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DuKE L.J. 875; Jennings, The Role of the
States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 193 (1958);
Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965).
2. Borden, Going Private--Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974);
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporation Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297
(1974); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein,4 Restatement]; Goldman & Wolfe, In Response to '!4
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts," 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1977); Greene, Corporate
Freeze-Out Mergers: A ProposedAnalysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487 (1976).
3. The merger in which a majority stockholder pays cash as consideration for all, or sub-
stantially all, the remaining publicly held minority shares has been variously described as a take
out, cash out, squeeze out, and freeze out. References to the majority stockholder as the possessor
of coercive power is not limited or confined to a person or persons owning a majority of the voting
stock in the target corporation but includes those whose control of the enterprise through stock
ownership and domination of the proxy machinery effectively enables them to determine the
terms of the merger. Brudney & Chirelstein,.4 Restatement, supra note 2, at 1358 n.10. This note
will use the term "take out" to describe this transaction.
There are generally three situations in which a take out merger can occur: (1) two-step or
second step mergers, (2) going private transactions, and (3) mergers of affiliates (parent-subsidiary
mergers). Two-step take out mergers involve a controlling public corporation-as opposed to a
controlling individual or group of individuals---that acquires another public corporation through
the culmination of a single plan effected over a short time. In the typical two-step merger scena-
rio, an attacking corporation offers to purchase greater than 50% of the shares of a target corpora-
tion. After a successful tender offer, the attacking corporation merges the target corporation into
itself or a subsidiary.
A "true" going private transaction .. . is one by which an individual or a group of
individuals controlling a public corporation undertake a corporate transaction in order
to acquire, either immediately or on a deferred basis, the entire equity interest in the
corporation. The corporate transaction may take any one of several forms: a merger, a
reverse split or other form of charter amendment, a sale of assets, or a dissolution ...
In a typical going private transaction, the founder of a company that had previously
gone public elects to reverse his steps and restore the corporation to the status of sole
ownership.
A. BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE § 1.02, at 1-3 (1982). Finally, a merger of affiliates involves a pro-
posed take out merger between a parent corporation and a subsidiary corporation that the parent
has controlled for an extended period of time. Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note
2, at 1370. As such, mergers between affiliates are distinguished from two-step mergers because
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and the appropriate judicial and legislative role in protecting minority stock-
parent-subsidiary mergers are not the product of an arm's length deal. Id. at 1371. In the typical
parent-subsidiary merger, the parent corporation controls a majority of the subsidiary's board of
directors either through interlocking directorates or by officers of the parent sitting as members of
the subsidiary's board. Id. at 1370.
An excellent historical perspective on the law of take out mergers is provided in Weiss, The
Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 624 (1981). Professor
Weiss divides the historical evolution of take out mergers into four phases. Phase I was character-
ized by the common-law vested rights approach in which one stockholder in a corporation could
block all other stockholders from making any fundamental changes in the corporation's business
or charter. Id. at 626. This approach was based on the interpretation of the corporate charter as a
contract both among the corporation's stockholders and between the state of incorporation and
the corporation. Id. at 627-29. See also Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Share-
holders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 69, 77-82.
Phase II was the beginning of liberalization in which state legislatures recognized that unani-
mous stockholder approval requirements "created the potential for tyranny by the minority, thus
impeding economic progress by blocking desirable commercial transactions." Weiss, supra, at
629. States responded by passing statutes providing for "sales of assets, mergers and consolida-
tions, and voluntary licjuidations, when approved by a corporation's board of directors and a
majority or supramajonty (rather than all) of [the] stockholders." Id. The courts, however, did
not hesitate to exercise their equitable powers in this phase to limit perceived abuses of the stat-
utes, as the following passage indicates:
"With reference to the power given to the majority or a certain proportion to dis-
solve, to sell all the assets, to merge or consolidate .. . the courts have generally implied
equitable limitations to reach just results. The wide powers granted [by statute] have not
been interpreted to be unrestricted .... The use of these devices by the majority...
has, as a rule, been strongly disapproved. Where merger or consolidation has been
sought, fair terms and equality of treatment have been required, and the stockholder has
not been forced to take the value of his shares except when these conditions have been
met, and, of course, any others that the statute has prescribed."
Id at 631 (quoting Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given to Majority
Stockholders, 30 MICH. L. Rav. 645, 664-65 (1932)).
Phase III was marked by the first cash merger statutes. Florida was the first state to adopt a
cash merger statute. Id at 632. The statute provided that merger or consolidation agreements
"may provide for the distribution of cash, notes or bonds, in whole or in part, in lieu of stock to
stockholders of the constituent corporations or any of them." Act of June 1, 1925, ch. 10096, § 36,
1925 Fla. Laws 134 (current version codified at FLA. STAT. ANN'. § 607.214 (West 1977)). There is
some question, however, whether the early cash merger statutes were intended to authorize take
outs:
[Tihe conclusion most consistent with the available evidence is that the first cash
merger statutes were enacted as part of a general effort to provide additional flexibility in
the structuring of mergers, particularly since cash clearly could be used in bona fide
business combinations accomplished by sales of assets. There is no evidence that the
draftsmen of [these early] cash merger statutes anticipated that the statutes would be
construed to authorize take outs, and a significant amount of evidence suggests that the
draftsmen viewed take outs to be generally prohibited.
Weiss, supra, at 641.
Finally, phase IV is characterized by the legitimization of cash take out mergers. The first
cash merger statute interpreted to authorize cash take outs was the New York short-form merger
provision for gas and electric companies holding more than 95% of their subsidiary's stock. Id at
641-43. See Act of May 28, 1936, ch. 778, § 12(1), 1936 N.Y. Laws 1658 (current version codified
at N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 901(a)(1) (McKinney 1963)). This provision was justified by the New
York State Joint Legislative Committee because "'the consolidation of operating companies...
[is desirable] to effectuate greater economies, more efficient management and rate reductions.'"
Weiss, supra at 642 (quoting Jt. Legislative Committee to Investigate Utilities, Report, Doc. No.
78, 159th Sess. 149 (1936), reprinted in 19 N.Y. Legis. Documents (1936)). Although the statute
was passed in 1936, the first case challenging the statute's constitutionality was Beloff v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949). The court rejected plaintiff's vested-right
claim and "upheld the statute on the ground that 'the merged corporation's shareholder has only
one real right; to have the value of his holding protected, and that protection is given him by his
right to an appraisal.'" Weiss, supra, at 643 (quoting Beloff, 300 N.Y. at 19, 87 N.E.2d at 564). In
a similar challenge to the Delaware short-form merger statute the Delaware Supreme Court re-
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holders.4 Since Delaware is considered the leader in the "race to the bot-
tom,"'5 considerable attention was focused on the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion in Singer v. Magnovox Co. 6 The Singer court concluded that a pro-
posed take out merger "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, [was] an abuse of the corporate process,"'7 even though the
merger complied literally with the Delaware corporation statutes.8 Thus, the
court held that a merger, undertaken without any purpose other than the elim-
ination of the minority stockholders, was a violation of the fiduciary duty
owed by the majority stockholders to the minority.9 In Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. ,o however, the court rejected the Singer "business purpose" test as a de-
parture from previous case law and concluded that no "additional meaningful
protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose require-
jected a stockholder's challenge to a take out merger. Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38
Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959). In Coyne the court relied on the state's reserved power to
amend corporate statutes to hold that the statute did not unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of
their vested constitutional rights. Id. at 521-22, 154 A.2d at 897-98. The court also rejected plain-
tiffs' contention that "expulsion of a shareholder from the enterprise in which he has invested is
contrary to the settled policy of the law." Id. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895; see Weiss, supra, at 650-51.
4. See, e.g., Arsht, Minority Stockholder Freezeouts Under Delaware Law, 32 Bus. LAW.
1495 (1977); Balotti, The Elimination o/the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to § 251 o/the
General Corporation Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 63 (1976); Brudney, A Note on Going
Private, 61 VA. L. REv. 1019 (1975); Gannon,An Evaluation ofthe SEC's New Going Private Rule,
7 J. CORP. LAW 55 (1981); Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, Shareholders' Rights in Short-Form
Mergers: The New Delaware Formula, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1981); Note, Delaware Corporation
Law. Weinberger v. UOP, IncA Limitation of Singer Fairness Standards?, 42 U. Pirr. L. REV.
915 (1981).
5. The attempt by state legislatures to develop the most liberal general corporation act has
been characterized as the race to the bottom. See supra note 1. The leader in the race to the
bottom is considered to be Delaware because the Delaware Act is considered the least restrictive
act with regard to the interests of the corporation. See Cary, supra note 1, at 663-70.
6. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of
Mergers-The Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnovox Company, 33 Bus. LAW. 2231 (1978); Note,
Singer v. Magnovox Co.: Delaware Imposes Restrictions on Freeze-Out Mergers, 66 CALIF. L.
REv. 118 (1978); Note, Delaware Chills Freeze-Outs: A Critical Brief of Singer v. The Magnovox
Co. and Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc., 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 426 (1978); Note,
Singer v. Magnovox Co.: Minority Rights in Freeze-out Mergers, 83 DICK. L. REv. 159 (1978);
Note, Singer v. Magnovox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64 VA. L. REV. 1101 (1978).
7. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
8. Singer involved a challenge to a long-form merger authorized by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251 (1983). The court described § 251 as follows:
Section 251 authorizes a merger and any judicial consideration of that kind of together-
ness must begin from that premise.
Section 251 also specifies in detail the procedures to be followed in accomplishing a
merger. Briefly, these include approvals by the directors of each corporation and by
"majority [vote] of the outstanding stock of' each corporation, followed by the execution
and filing of formal documents. The consideration given to the shareholders of a constit-
uent corporation in exchange for their stock may take the form of "cash, property, rights
or secunties of any other corporation." § 251(b)(4). A shareholder who objects to the
merger and is dissatisfied with the value of the consideration given for his shares may
seek an appraisal under 8 Del C § 262.
Singer, 380 A.2d at 973-74. The court concluded that "[iun this appeal it is uncontroverted thatdefendants complied with the stated requirements of § 251." Id. at 975.
9. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
10. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Weinberger 111, rev'g 426 A.2d
1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Weinberger 11]. In Weinberger I, 409 A.2d 1262 (Del.
Ch. 1979), plaintiffs complaint was dismissed. See infra note 16. Weinberger 111 was decided just
five and one-half years after Singer.
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ment."I' Instead, the court announced a newly formulated fiduciary fairness
test based on the "entire fairness" of the transaction. To ensure the effective-
ness of this test and to balance the corporate necessity of finality in merger
transactions with the need for minority stockholder protection, the court liber-
alized the appraisal proceeding 12 and mandated stockholder objections to this
basic remedy.
This note examines the development of the business purpose test 13 and
analyzes the Weinberger court's rejection of it. It concludes that the court's
failure to resolve the underlying policy considerations relevant to the various
types of take out mergers and the internal inconsistencies in the court's reason-
ing provide inadequate guidance for the lower courts and undermine the prec-
edential value of the Weinberger decision.
Plaintiff in Weinberger, a former stockholder of UOP, challenged a
merger effected by The Signal Companies, Inc., UOP's former majority stock-
holder. 14 On behalf of the class composed of all UOP stockholders who, as of
the date the merger was effectuated,' 5 had not exchanged their shares for the
merger price, plaintiff's amended complaint16 attacked the transaction on the
11. Weinberger HI, 457 A.2d at 715.
12. An appraisal is a judicial proceeding in which the court determines the fair value of the
minority stockholder's interest. In Delaware the relevant statutory language is in DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983). Section 262 provides that any stockholder who has complied with the
technical standing requirements of subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g) and has "neither voted in favor
of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing ... shall be entitled to an ap-
praisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of his shares of stock." Id. § 262(a). If the
consideration for the minority stockholders' shares is cash or cash and debt securities, appraisal is
available as of right irrespective of the number of stockholders of the corporation or whether the
shares are listed on a national exchange. Id. § 262(b)(2). In addition, the appraisal right is guar-
anteed if the merger is a short-form merger pursuant to § 253. Id. § 262(b)(3). See also infra note
48. Furthermore, a corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that stockholders be
given appraisal rights when certain major corporate events occur, such as a merger or consolida-
tion. Id. § 262(c).
As the ultimate arbiter of the fair value of the shares, the Court of Chancery appraises the
shares, "determining their fair value exclusive of any element of value arising from the accom-
plishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest
." Id. § 262(h).
13. See infra note 66.
14. Both The Signal Companies, Inc. and UOP, Inc. were incorporated in Delaware. The
merger was effectuated between UOP and Sigco, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Signal
Companies. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1335. "As a result of the merger, UOP, as the surviving
entity, became the wholly-owned subsidiary of Signal, and UOP's former minority stockholders
were paid the sum of $21 per share for their former interests in UOP." Id.
15. The merger was effectuated on May 26, 1978. Originally, plaintiff William Weinberger
sought to represent the class of all UOP stockholders who, as of May 26, 1978, had not exchanged
their shares for the merger price. Id After the trial, plaintiff filed a motion seeking "to enlarge the
class so as to include all former stockholders of UOP as of the time of the merger," id, including
those stockholders who had exchanged their shares for the $21 merger price. Since the trial court
entered judgment in favor of UOP, Signal, and Lehman Brothers, the Chancellor did not consider
plaintiff's motion to enlarge the class. Id at 1363. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, or-
dered that plaintifi's request to enlarge the class be granted on remand. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d
at 715.
16. In a pretrial ruling the Chancellor had ordered the complaint dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 703 n.4. Plaintiff had not alleged specific acts
of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the
merger terms to the minority. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Weinberger 1].
19841
NORTH CAROLINA LAWAREVIEW
theory that the majority's offer of twenty-one dollars per share was grossly
inadequate. Defendants were The Signal Companies, Inc.,17 UOP, Inc.,18 and
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.19
Signal acquired its 50.5 percent interest in UOP in 1975 following friendly
arm's length negotiations between the boards of Signal and UOP.20 After this
share purchase, Signal nominated seven of the thirteen UOP directors.21 Al-
though Signal did not anticipate acquisition of the remaining 49.5 percent of
UOP's outstanding shares at the time of the initial purchase, Signal's inability
to find suitable investments or realistic acquisition opportunities for its excess
cash caused the company to consider obtaining all of UOP's stock. To evalu-
ate this alternative, Signal's management instigated a feasibility study. The
study was performed by two officers of Signal who were also directors of Sig-
nal and UOP.22 They concluded that Signal should acquire the remaining
17. The trial court described Signal as follows:
Signal is a diversified, technologically based company operating through various
subsidiaries. Two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries are The Garrett Corp. and Mack
Trucks, Inc. The former is engaged in the design, engineering, manufacture and sale of
transportation related equipment and services, including those involved in the aerospace
industry. The latter is similarly involved in the area of heavy-duty motor trucks and
truck tractors. Through substantial investments in other companies Signal is also en-
gaged in the manufacture of industrial products, land development, radio and television
broadcasting, entertainment and shipping. Its stock is publicly held and is listed on the
New York, Philadelphia and Pacific Stock Exchanges.
Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1335.
18. The court described UOP as follows:
UOP, formerly known as Universal Oil Products Co., is a diversified industrial com-
pany which, as of the beginning of 1978, was engaged in six major lines of business.
These included petroleum and petrochemical services and related products, construction,
fabricated metal products, transportation equipment products, chemicals and plastics,
and other products and services including land development, lumber products, and a
process for the conversion of municipal sewage sludge into organic soil supplements. Its
stock was publicly held and was listed on the New York Stock Exchange at the time.
Id. at 1335.
19. "Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. is an investment banking firm with a long-standing
business relationship with UOP." Id. James W. Glanville, a partner of Lehman Brothers, was a
UOP director. Id at 1338. Lehman Brothers was retained to give a "fairness opinion" regarding
the $21 per share offered by Signal. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 706. Prior to the final oral
argument before the Delaware Supreme Court, plaintiff dropped his complaint against Lehman
Brothers. Id. at 703 n.3.
20. As a result of these negotiations Signal agreed to purchase 1.5 million of UOP's author-
ized but previously unissued shares at a price of $21 per share. This purchase was contingent,
however, upon the success of a cash tender offer by Signal for 4.3 million publicly held shares of
UOP. Although 78.2% of the publicly held shares were tendered at this time (approximately 7.8
million), Signal purchased only enough shares to become a 50.5% majority stockholder. We/n-
berger I, 426 A.2d at 1336.
21. At the annual meeting following the share purchase, Signal nominated only six of the
thirteen UOP directors. Five were directors or employees of Signal and the sixth, a partner in the
investment banking firm of Lazard Freres & Co., had been one of Signal's representatives in the
negotiations with UOP. Later in 1975, the president and chief executive officer of UOP, who also
held a seat on the UOP board, retired. Signal named Crawford, a long-time employee and senior
executive vice president of the Garrett Corp., see supra note 17, to replace him as president and
board member. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1336.
22. Weinberger11, 426 A.2d at 1337. These officers were: Arledge, vice president and direc-
tor of planning for Signal, and Chitiea, senior vice president and chief financial officer of Signal.
Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705. This feasibility study played a critical role in the supreme
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shares of UOP at any price up to twenty-four dollars per share. 23
After the feasibility study had been concluded, Signal's executive commit-
tee was convened to consider the acqusition through a take out merger. The
committee consulted with Crawford, UOP's president and chief executive of-
ficer,24 before determining that an acqusition price of twenty to twenty-one
dollars per share would be fair to Signal and the minority stockholders of
UOP. 25 On February 28, 1978, Signal issued a press release announcing that
"negotiations" were being conducted with UOP for the purpose of acquiring
the outstanding minority shares for cash.26
Following this public announcement, Crawford retained Lehman Broth-
ers27 to render a fairness opinion about the price offered by Signal. After con-
court's conclusion that Signal did not meet its fiduciary obligations. See infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text.
23. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705. The report described the advantages to Signal of the
acquisition and outlined the purposes of the merger as follows:
1) Provides an outstanding investment opportunity for Signal--(Better than any re-
cent acquisition we have seen).
2) Increases Signal's earnings.
3) Facilitates the flow of resources between Signal and its subsidiaries--(Big fac-
tor-works both ways).
4) Provides cost savings potential for Signal and UOP.
5) Improves the percentage of Signal's 'operating earnings' as opposed to 'holding
company earnings'.
6) Simplifies the understanding of Signal.
7) Facilitates technological exchange among Signal's subsidiaries.
8) Eliminates potential conflicts of interest.
Id. at 708 (parentheses indicate handwritten comments of Arledge).
24. See supra note 21. As a courtesy to UOP's president, Crawford was invited to attend the
executive committee meeting. Prior to the meeting, Crawford met privately with Signal's board
chairman Walkup, and President Shumway. They asked Crawford for his reaction to the pro-
posed price range of $20 to $21 per share. Crawford indicated that he thought the offer was
"generous," but that certain internal problems might develop at UOP if its employees were not
given some assurances of their future position in a wholly owned Signal subsidiary and its key
personnel were not compensated for their incentive stock options which could be wiped out by a
merger. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 705.
25. At the time of the first public announcement, UOP's stock was trading at $14.50 per
share. The highest market price for the years 1974-1978 was $18.75 in 1974. The average high
trading price during those years was $17.05, and the average closing price was $13.20. See Wein-
berger II, 426 A.2d at 1361-62.
26. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 706. At trial plaintiff contended that the use of the word
"negotiations" was misleading because Crawford immediately agreed to the suggested price range
of $20 to $21 per share. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1350-51. He contended that the evidence did
not reveal anything that could be considered negotiation. Plaintiff further contended that UOP's
subsequent modification of their proxy statement to shareholders was evidence of misleading press
releases. Id at 1351. UOP had replaced the word "negotiations" with "discussions" when the
SEC sought details of the negotiations. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 706-08. Although the
supreme court did not hold that these discrepancies constituted misleading information, the court
did note that the result might have been different had an independent negotiating board consisting
of the non-Signal UOP board members been used. Id at 709 n.7. See infra notes 92-98 and
accompanying text.
27. Two reasons were given by Crawford for the selection of Lehman Brothers.
First, the time schedule between the announcement and the board meetings was short
(only three business days) and since Lehman Brothers had been acting as UOP's invest-
ment banker for many years, he felt that it would be in the best position to respond on
such short notice. Secondly, James W. Glanville, a long-time director of UOP, was also
a partner of Lehman Brothers and had long acted as a financial advisor to UOP. Craw-
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tacting UOP's outside directors, and after various contacts with Signal officers,
Crawford advised Signal's chairman that "as a result of his communications
with UOP's non-Signal directors, it was his feeling that the price would have
to be the top of the proposed range, or $21 per share, if the approval of UOP's
outside directors was to be obtained."'28 On March 6, 1978, just four business
days after the initial public announcement, Signal and UOP's boards of direc-
tors adopted resolutions agreeing to the proposed merger at a price of twenty-
one dollars per share.29 By the terms of the merger proposal, consummation of
the merger required approval of a "majority of UOP's outstanding minority
shares voting at the stockholders' meeting at which the merger would be con-
sidered, and that the minority shares voting in favor of the merger, when cou-
pled with Signal's 50.5% interest would have to comprise at least two-thirds of
all UOP shares."30 The merger was approved by UOP's minority stockholders
at their annual meeting on May 26, 1978.31
Following the UOP stockholder approval of the merger, plaintiff attacked
the validity of the transaction and sought to set the merger aside or, in the
alternative, to receive money damages. During the eleven day trial,32 plaintiff
ford felt that Glanville's familiarity with UOP as a member of its board as well as being
a member of Lehman Brothers would also be of assistance in enabling Lehman Brothers
to render an opinion within the existing time constraints.
Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1338.
28. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 706.
29. On the date that the merger was to be approved, both boards convened. Telephone com-munications were maintained so that the dual directors could participate in both meetings.
Walkup, Signal's board chairman, attended the UOP meeting to present Signal's views and an-
swer any questions the non-Signal UOP directors might have. On the advice of counsel, Signal's
UOP directors abstained from voting. (The only exceptions were Crawford, UOP president, and
Signal's Lazard Freres & Co. representative, who voted in favor of the transaction.). See id at
706-07.
30. See id at 707. The effect of this voting structure was to neutralize the majority's voting
power by giving the minority veto power over the transaction.
Professor Borden has maintained that neutralized voting, absent proof of faulty disclosure,
would be effective against ajudicial attack. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1039. In a recent treatise,
A. BORDEN, GoING PRIVATE (1982), he renews this opinion and supports his view with the court's
analysis in Weinberger I and 11. Borden's reasoning flows from a practical view of the judicial
analysis:
Where a majority in interest of the minority, interested enough to express its views at the
shareholder meeting, elects to accept that higher price [the offering price is invariably
above the market price], a court would have to possess an unusual degree of confidence
in its own financial acumen to say to the approving majority that their securities must
relapse in price to their pre-going private announcement market level because the judge,
aspaterfamilias, doesn't think it is good for them ....
Id. § 4.06, at 4-17. This "reality" seems to have been recognized by the Weinberger I opinion.
The court stated that "where corporate action has been approved by an informed vote of a major-
ity of the minority shareholders, we conclude that the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the transaction was unfair to the minority." Weinberger 11I, 457 A.2d at 703.
31. There were 11,488,302 shares outstanding as of the record date of the meeting, 5,688,302
of which were owned by Signal. Although only 56% of the minority shares voted at the meeting(3,208,652 shares), 51.9% of the total minority (2,953,812 shares) voted for the merger. Signal's
stock and the minority shares voting for the merger totaled 76.2% (8,642,114 shares). Weinberger
III, 457 A.2d at 708.
32. Over 3000 pages of testimony were offered at trial, and the trial exhibits comprised sev-
eral volumes. Post-trial briefing and argument were extensive. The trial court concluded that "[i]t
would be difficult to believe that anything worth arguing about has been omitted." Weinberger I1,
426 A.2d at 1363.
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offered evidence to support his allegations that: (1) no legally proper purpose
for the merger existed; (2) Signal had abused its majority position by dissemi-
nating misleading proxy information and press releases; (3) UOP's Signal-con-
trolled board had failed to execute its fiduciary duty to its stockholders; and
(4) the true value of the minority shares was not less than twenty-six dollars
per share. The court of chancery rejected each of these contentions and held
that "the terms of the merger were legally fair to the plaintiff and other minor-
ity stockholders of UOP. ''33
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the following ques-
tions: (1) whether a plaintiff in a suit challenging a take out merger must allege
specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other items of misconduct to
demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority; (2) whether
the burden of proof shifts from the majority stockholder to the plaintiff when
the merger has been approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minor-
ity stockholders; (3) whether the merger was fair in terms of the adequacy of
defendants' disclosures; (4) whether the price offered by the majority was fair
to the minority stockholders; and (5) whether the requirement of a legitimate
business purpose for the merger was still the law of Delaware.34
The court first approved the Chancellor's conclusion that a plaintiff in a
suit challenging a take out merger must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct when the complaint reveals that the approval
or rejection of the merger was left to the minority stockholders. 35 Second, the
court shifted the ultimate burden of proof to the plaintiff when the corporate
action taken was approved by an informed vote of the minority stockhold-
ers.36 This shifting of the burden of proof is closely tied to the third inquiry.
The court concluded that Signal failed to establish that the vote of the minor-
ity was an informed vote.37 Since material information relating to the bar-
gaining positions of Signal and UOP was withheld, the court held that the
merger did not meet the test of fairness and, thus, no burden shifted to plaintiff
33. Id
34. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 703.
35. Id See also Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1342; Weinberger I, 409 A.2d at 1267. In Wein-
berger I the Chancellor stated this proposition as follows:
As I see it, under Singer, a complaint does not have to allege the particulars of why
a merger is unfair so long as it alleges a use of its position by a majority shareholder to
cash-out the minority on inadequate terms for no sufficient business purpose other than
to get rid of them. Such general allegations coupled with factual assertions showing a
use of the majority position is sufficient to state a cause of action and to place the burden
on the majority shareholder, as part of its fiduciary duty, to prove th.s fairness of the
merger terms as opposed to requiring the plaintiff to prove that they were unfair. But
where the complaint fails to charge a use of its majority position by a shareholder to
bring about a predetermined result affecting the minority, and simply charges, in es-
sence, that the terms of the merger proposed by the majority shareholder were unfair,
then it seems to me that the burden should then be on the plaintiff to allege and prove
the unfairness, or to allege fraud or some other basis for condemning the terms of the
merger plan.
Id.
36. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 703.
37. Id. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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by virtue of the minority stockholder vote.38
The fourth question addressed by the supreme court concerned the ade-
quacy of the price offered by the majority. The court rejected the long-stand-
ing "Delaware block" 39 approach to valuation applied by the Chancellor and
announced a liberalized appraisal proceeding based on any generally accepted
techniques used in the financial community and the courts.40 Finally, the
court reconsidered and rejected the business purpose requirement enunciated
in Singer.4' The supreme court, en banc, reversed the Chancellor's findings
that both the circumstances of the merger and the price paid the minority
stockholders were fair, and remanded the case for further proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion.42
The Weinberger decision represents a further modification of the develop-
ing law of take out mergers. At common law, stockholders had a veto power
over all fundamental changes in the corporation's business or charter.43 The
evolution of modem liberal corporation acts, however, rejected this vested
rights approach.44 Although courts initially had required equity consideration
in merger transactions, by the late 1960s many states recognized the right of a
majority stockholder or group of stockholders to effectuate a merger and elim-
inate the minority stockholders by exchanging their shares for cash.45
The first Delaware case upholding a cash take out merger was Coyne v.
Park & Tiford Distillers Corp. ,46 decided in 1959. In Coyne plaintiffs con-
tended that "expulsion of a shareholder from the enterprise in which he has
invested . . . is contrary to the settled policy of the law,"47 and that section
253,48 which authorized short-form mergers for cash, was unconstitutional as
applied since the minority stockholders were deprived of vested contractual
rights.49 The supreme court rejected these contentions and concluded that the
statute clearly authorized cash alone as consideration in a short-form
38. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 703.
39. See infra note 89.
40. Weinberger 11I, 457 A.2d at 703-04, 712-13.
41. Id. at 704, 715.
42. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 715.
43. See Weiss, supra note 3.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 38 Del. Ch. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959). Plaintiff in Coyne challenged a short-form merger
by Schenley Industries, Inc., the 96% majority stockholder of Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.
47. Id. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895.
48. The Delaware short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983), authorizes
a merger of a 90% owned subsidiary into its parent without prior notice. In a § 253 short-form
merger the parent corporation can merge its subsidiary corporation into itself by executing, ac-
knowledging, and filing a certificate of ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution
of its board of directors authorizing the merger. If the subsidiary corporation is not wholly
owned, however, the resolution "shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, including the
securities, cash, property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered, or granted by the surviving corpo-
ration upon surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation or corporations not owned by
the parent corporation." Id.
49. Plaintiffs argued as follows:
Each acquired his shares before the passage of the 1957 amendment. When he
bought his stock Section 251 permitted only the conversion of shares into shares in a
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merger.50 The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute under the "re-
served power" of the Delaware statutes.5
1
Four years later, in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 52 the court reaf-
firmed Coyne and implied that, absent circumstances which the court could
not anticipate, appraisal was the stockholders' exclusive remedy in short-form
mergers.
Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute
in which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority
to set aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the
statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminat-
ing the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter
the former shareholder has only a monetary claim. This power of
the parent to eliminate the minority is a complete answer to plain-
tifi's charge of breach of trust against the directors. .... 53
Although the court's statement was unsupported by legislative authority, "fol-
lowing Stauffer the generally accepted view was that section 253 not only au-
thorized, but was enacted to expedite, take out mergers."54
In 1967 Delaware amended its general corporation act to authorize the
use of cash as consideration in long-form mergers.55 Prior to this amendment,
the Delaware courts had imposed broad general fiduciary standards of corpo-
merger. The right to demand in a merger conversion of his shares into other shares
became vested, and no subsequently enacted statute could destroy it.
Coyne, 38 Del. Ch. at 519, 154 A.2d at 897.
50. Id at 519, 154 A.2d at 896. This conclusion has been criticized by Professor Weiss as
without merit in light of the support cited by the court. Weiss, supra note 3, at 651. He states that
the court's conclusion that
"[s]ince 1941, Delaware had allowed use of'shares or other securities' in long-form merg-
ers, which made it possible 'to terminate a shareholder's stock interest by issuing redeem-
able bonds or similar monetary obligations,' [was a conclusion] unsupported by any
Delaware cases and also contrary to the New Jersey courts' interpretation of the compa-
rable provisions of the New Jersey statute.'
Id. (quoting Coyne, 38 Del. Ch. at 517, 154 A.2d at 895).
51. Co~ye, 38 Del. Ch. at 521, 154 A.2d at 897. The court noted that the Delaware general
corporation law" 'may be amended or repealed, at the pleasure of the legislature.'" Id. (quoting
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 364 (repealed 1967)) (now codified at DEL. CODE ANN., title 8, § 394
(1983)). This statute, the court found, "authorize[s] the enactment of statutes changing the rights
of stockholders in respect of shares acquired prior to such enactment." Id. at 522, 154 A.2d at 897.
52. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962).
53. Id. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
54. Weiss, supra note 3, at 651-52. See Carl Marks & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 43
Del. Ch. 391, 392-93, 233 A.2d 63, 64 (1967).
55. The Delaware long-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983), governs the
merger of two or more corporations when the merger does not involve a greater than 90% parent
corporation.
Section 251 authorizes the merger of two or more domestic corporations pursuant to an
agreement of merger or consolidation adopted, executed, and filed in accordance with the provi-
sions of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 251(c) (1983). To initiate the merger process, the board of
directors of each corporation must approve an agreement of merger or consolidation. Id.
§ 251(b). Once this has been accomplished, the agreement of merger or consolidation is submitted
to the stockholders of each corporation at an annual or special meeting called for the purpose of
acting on the agreement. If the agreement is approved by a majority of the outstanding stock of




rate duty and loyalty to corporations on both sides of a long-form merger
transaction.5 6 In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. ,5 decided in 1952 before
both Coyne and Stauffer, the court considered whether the terms of a proposed
merger of the Mayflower Hotel Corporation into its parent corporation, Hilton
Hotels Corporation, was fair to the minority stockholders of Mayflower. After
recognizing the "settled rule of law" that Hilton, as the majority stockholder of
Mayflower, occupied a fiduciary position in relation to the minority stockhold-
ers,58 the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that "[s]ince [Hilton stands] on
both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing its entire
fairness." 59 As such, the merger was subjected to "the test of careful scrutiny
by the courts." 60 Although the supreme court never rejected the applicability
of Sterling's "entire fairness" standard to cash take out mergers after 1967,
most observers believed that the Coyne and Stauffer line of cases relegated the
minority stockholders in long-form, as well as short-form mergers, to the ap-
praisal remedy as their exclusive protection and recourse.61
Given most observers' assumption that a minority stockholder's exclusive
remedy in a take out merger was an appraisal of his shares, the court's opinion
in Singer v. Magnavox Co. 62 was a dramatic reversal in favor of minority
stockholders.63 The court rejected the notion that appraisal was the exclusive
56. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-110.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Weiss, supra note 3, at 655. See Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1286 (2d
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462, 479 n.16 (1977); Singer v. Magnovox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1361-62
(Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd in part and af'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971). See generally Arsht, supra note 4; Balotti,
supra note 4, at 67-77.
62. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Singer involved a two-step takeover attempt by North Ameri-
can Philips Corporation (North American). Following a successful tender offer by North Ameri-
can Philips Development Corp. (Development), a subsidiary of North American, Development
sought to eliminate the remaining minority shareholders (approximately 15.9% of the total out-
standing stock) of The Magnovox Company. Plaintiff, a minority stockholder of Magnovox, al-
leged that: (I) the merger was fraudulent in that it did not serve any business purpose other than
the forced removal of public minority stockholders at a grossly inadequate price; (2) defendants
breached their fiduciary duties in approving the merger at a cash price they knew to be grossly
inadequate; and (3) the merger was accomplished in a manner violative of the antifraud provi-
sions of the Delaware Securities Act, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (1983). Since Singer was
considered a complete break with past precedent, numerous notes, articles, and comments have
interpreted its effect. See supra notes 3, 4 & 6.
63. Many observers have speculated on possible reasons for the sudden reversal by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. See Arsht, supra note 4; Brudney & Chirelstein,, Restatement, supra note
2; Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; McBride, supra note 6; Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, stpra
note 4; and Notes cited in supra note 6. The two most persuasive reasons are: the implied threat
of federal solutions if state law failed to provide adequate protection to minority stockholders, and
the perceived inadequacies of the statutory appraisal remedy under the Delaware block approach
to valuation.
In Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs'
allegations that the breach of fiduciary duty by a majority stockholder in a short-form merger
states a cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1982), and the corresponding rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982), absent conduct
that "can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive."' Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74. The
Court concluded, however, as follows:
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remedy for minority stockholders who objected to a long-form merger that
technically complied with the statutory requirements. 64 In addition the court
rejected defendants' contention that their offer of fair value fully discharged
the parent corporation's fiduciary obligations.65 The court concluded that a
long-form merger, "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority share-
As the Court stated in Cori v. Ash ...: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and
investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
We thus adhere to the position that "Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate
transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co, 404 U.S. at 12. There may well be a
need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged
in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to "cover the corporate universe."
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
The second pre-Singer indication that federal restrictions were imminent was proposed rules
13e-3A and 13e-3B in 1975. SEC Release No. 33-5567, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975). These proposed "going private" rules covered a broad spec-
trum of corporate transactions that had the effect of removing any class of equity security from the
public market. A. BORDEN, supra note 3, at § 2.05.
Proposed Rule 13e-3A required that consideration offered to security holders must "con-
stitute fair value as determined in good faith by the issuer or its affiliate, and shall be no
lower than the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified independant per-
sons." Proposed Rule 13e-3B, on the other hand, required that there be a "valid business
purpose" for the transaction and that the terms of such transaction be "fair."
Id.
In 1977 a new version of rule 13e-3 was proposed. SEC Release No. 33-5884 [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977). This proposal required both
"substantive and procedural fairness" and provided that any rule 13e-3 transaction that was "un-
fair to unaffiliated security holders" was a "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act." A. BOR-
DEN, supra note 3, at § 2.08. Although the rule that was eventually adopted, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3
(1983); see also SEC Release No. 33-6100 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979); retreated substantially from the substantive regulation of its prior drafts, the
threat of federal action prior to Singer was real. (Rule 13e-3, as adopted, seeks to regulate going
private transactions by requiring detailed disclosure of their fairness.) See also Gannon, supra
note 4, at 56.
The second explanation for the court's about face in Singer was the growing perception that
the appraisal remedy was wholly inadequate to protect minority stockholders. As early as 1964,
Professor Vorenberg criticized the appraisal remedy as a justification for rejecting substantive
merger requirements. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness ofthe Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REv. 1189(1964). Professor Vorenberg argued that: (1) even under the best of statutory
appraisal procedures, forced resort to an appraisal often will give the stockholder less than his
stock is worth; (2) a stockholder may have some other relationship with the corporation that will
be jeopardized; and (3) in many cases the most serious consequence to a stockholder forced to take
cash when the majority chooses to be rid of him will be the impact of federal capital gains taxes
payable on any appreciation in value of his stock. Id. at 1200-05.
64. Singer, 380 A.2d at 975-77.
65. The court rejected defendants' contention that because the stockholder's right is exclu-
sively in the value of his investment, an appraisal, which by definition results in fair value for the
shares, was the exclusive remedy.
This argument assumes that the right to take is coextensive with the power to take and
that a dissenting stockholder has no legally protected right in his shares, his certificate or
his company beyond a right to be paid fair value when the majority is ready to do this.
Simply stated, such an argument does not square with the duty stated so eloquently and
so forcefully by Chief Justice Layton in CGuth [v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(1939)].
Singer, 380 A.2d at 977-78. The duty established in Guth is quoted infra note 80.
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holders, is an abuse of the corporate process"'66 and a violation of the fiduciary
duty owed to the minority stockholders. 67 Thus, to meet the parent corpora-
tion's fiduciary duty after Singer, the majority stockholder was required to
establish a valid business purpose for the merger and demonstrate that the
circumstances satisfied the standard of entire fairness enunciated in Sterling.68
Shortly after the Singer decision was announced, the court broadened the
scope of the business purpose test. In Roland International Corp. v. Naj'ar69
the court rejected Roland's contention that the Delaware short-form merger
statute conclusively presumed a proper purpose.70 The court concluded that
"the principles announced in Singer with respect to a § 251 merger apply to a
§ 253 merger." 71
Although Singer's business purpose test was announced less than six years
before the Delaware Supreme Court considered Weinberger, the Weinberger
court summarily rejected72 its application to take out mergers as "new to our
law of mergers and. . . a departure from prior case law." 73 In light of the
persuasive precedential value of the Delaware courts' interpretations of the
Delaware corporation statutes, this flip-fiopping in the Delaware Supreme
Court's opinions is troublesome. The confusion inherent in the court's an-
nouncement of the business purpose requirement, 74 and evidenced by the sub-
sequent interpretation and application of this standard,75 circumscribed the
66. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980. The court concluded that, "a § 251 merger, made for the sole
purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and the com-
plaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action for violation of a fiduciary duty ......
Id. Although this holding has commonly been referred to as a "business purpose" test, the Singer
court clearly did not intend this requirement to be a business purpose test, per se. This conclusion
follows from the fact that the original version of the opinion established a business purpose test,
but this language was subsequently removed by the court and the above quoted phrase was put in
its place. See Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, supra note 6. Since most
commentators use the phrase "business purpose," as did the court in Weinberger III, this note
adopts the phrase with the above caveat.
67. Singer, 380 A.2d at 980.
68. Id. at 980. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
69. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
70. Id. at 1036.
71. Id. Roland contended that the Stauffer court held that the very purpose of § 253 is to
give the 90% owner a tool for eliminating the minority interest in the enterprise. The court re-
jected defendant's argument that Stauffer should control, concluding that any statement in Stau/-fer inconsistent with the holding that the principles announced in Singer were also applicable to a
short-form merger was overruled. Naij'ar, 407 A.2d at 1036.
72. The court rejected the business purpose test in the third and final part of the opinion,
after the substantive issues had been resolved.
In view of the fairness test which has long been applicable to parent-subsidiary
mergers.... the expanded appraisal remedy now available to shareholders, and the
broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may
dictate, we do not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority
shareholders by the business purpose requirement of the trilogy of Singer, Tanzer, Na-jar and their progeny.
Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 715 (citations omitted).
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
75. In Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), the court was asked to
resolve an issue explicitly left open by Singer, namely, whether a merger made primarily to ad-
vance the business purpose of the majority stockholder is a violation of the fiduciary duty. See
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thrust and effect of Singer.76
Unfortunately, the court's analysis in Weinberger suffers from similar in-
ternal inconsistencies and the same lack of clarity that contributed to the de-
mise of Singer.77 This confusion is a direct result of the court's failure to
resolve the fundamental issues underlying the law of take out mergers,
namely: (1) what is the nature of a stockholder's interest in the corporation?
and (2) what public policies are important to consider in developing an appro-
priate standard for evaluating take out mergers? 78 Although the ultimate reso-
lution of these questions is the subject of extensive debate and significant
disagreement,79 in order for the court to balance the interests of majority and
minority stockholders, provide an element of certainty in corporate transac-
tions, and avoid protractive litigation, the court must make explicit its under-
lying assumptions.
In Weinberger the court announced that, henceforth, the appropriate
fiduciary standard is the test of entire fairness enunciated in Sterling, absent
the Singer requirement that the elimination of minority stockholders not be
the sole purpose of the merger. The Weinberger court's concept of entire fair-
ness as it relates to take out mergers is rooted in the majority stockholder's
duties of loyalty, honesty, and good faith.80 'The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction,
Singer, 380 A.2d at 980 n.l 1. The court concluded that Singer could not be read to eliminate the
majority stockholder's right to vote its shares in its own interest. As such, the Tanzer court held
that the majority "need not sacrifice its own interest in dealing with a subsidiary; but that interest
must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself of unwanted minority
shareholders in the subsidiary." Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1124.
The chancery court applied this test in Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), to
enjoin a cash merger that would have eliminated the 45% interest of the minority in Valhi. The
court based its holding on the reasoning that the basic purpose of the merger was to eliminate the
minority. The court rejected defendant's argument that the merger would lead to tax savings for
the majority and avoid potential conflicts of interest, saying that these conflicts were "somewhat
contrived." Id. at 1377-78. At least one commentator has stated that this opinion "represents a
striking deviation from the Delaware courts' customary reluctance to second-guess corporate man-
agers' business judgments." Weiss, supra note 3, at 669 n.291.
76. Professor Weiss argued that the court's decisions applying the business purpose test may
reflect highly subjective decisions based largely on their assessment of the fairness of the individ-
ual transaction in front of the court at the time. Weiss, supra note 3, at 670-71. This view may
explain the differences in the court's seemingly strong business purpose requirement in Young v.
Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (DeL Ch. 1978), see supra note 75, and the seemingly weak application
in Weinberger I. Weiss, supra note 3, at 671 n.300.
77. See generally Arsht, supra note 4; Brudney & Chirelstein,4 Restatement, supra note 2;
Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; McBride, supra note 6; Weiss, supra note 3; Comment, supra
note 4; and Notes cited in supra note 6.
78. Virtually every commentator who has discussed the law of take out mergers has argued
that the transaction should be analyzed in accordance with the nature of the take out. Numerous
legislative and judicial schemes have been proposed to analyze going-private transactions, second
step mergers, and parent-subsidiary mergers. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, supra note 2; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 2;
Goldman & Wolfe, supra note 2; Greene, supra note 2; Weiss, supra note 3. AAthough courts have
recognized these commentators' views, they have refused to apply their analyses. See, e.g. , Najlar,
407 A.2d at 1034 n.4.
79. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, supra note
2; Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 2; Goldman & Wolfe, Mspra note 2; Greene,
supra note 2; Weiss, supra note 3.
80. Singer, 380 A.2d at 977. The classic definition of this standard was stated by Chief Jus-
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he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts."81 This concept of entire fairness has two com-
ponents: fair dealing and fair price.82 To ensure that minority stockholders
receive fair value for their shares, however, the court supplemented this entire
fairness standard with a liberalized appraisal remedy in which "proof of value
by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court"8 3 can be consid-
ered. Because of internal inconsistencies in the entire fairness standard and
the liberalized appraisal proceeding together with the incompatibility of these
concepts as expressed, the application of the Weinberger opinion to a given
factual situation is unclear.
Although the court indicated that the entire fairness standard is not a
bifurcated test,84 the method of analysis applied by the court is clearly indica-
tive of a two prong test.85 First, the court considered the question of fair deal-
ing and concluded that the Chancellor's findings-that Signal did not misuse
its position as the majority stockholder of UOP to disseminate less than candid
proxy information, 6 or violate its corresponding fiduciary duty87 -must be
tice Layton in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939), and has been repeated in
both Singer, 380 A.2d at 977, and Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 710.
While technically not trustees, [corporate directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and de-
rived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established
a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the
most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his
skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and
lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many
and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is
measured by no fixed scale.
Guth, 23 Del. Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.
81. Weinberger II[, 457 A.2d at 710. See also Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681
(Del. Ch. 1969), aft'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249
A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Sterling, 33 DeL Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 110.
82. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711.
83. Id. at 713. The origin of this concept in the decisions concerning the business purpose
test appears to be Justice Quillen's dissent in Najiar, in which he expressed the following
reservations:
Certainly this Court should not foster an unnecessary damage forum because of any
judicial limitation placed on the statutory appraisal procedure. Rather, we should en-
courage this legislatively established valuation process to be open to generally accepted
techniques of evaluation used in other areas of business and law.
407 A.2d at 1040 n.12 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
84. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711. It is unclear how the test can be applied in any
other way. The inquiries into the fairness of the transaction in terms of structure and disclosure
(fair dealing) and in terms of consideration offered per share (fair price) are concerned with totally
unrelated issues. The court did not intend to imply that a majority stockholder could meet its
fiduciary obligation without satisfying both prongs of the test.
85. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 711-15.
86. Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1353-56.
87. Id. at 1356.
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reversed.88 Then the court considered the trial court's treatment of the price
offered by Signal89 and concluded that the Chancellor's valuation approach
was no longer the law of Delaware. 90 Because the trial court had not consid-
ered plaintiff's evidence, the determination that the price offered was fair was
reversed.9 1
The supreme court's conclusion that "the record does not establish that
this transaction satisfies any reasonable concept of fair dealing" 92 was based
on four factors surrounding the circumstances of the merger. The merger was:
(1) entirely initiated by Signal, (2) presented to and approved by UOP's board
under severe time constraints, (3) conducted without any serious negotiations,
and (4) based on wholly incomplete disclosure since the Signal feasibility
study was not discussed with the outside directors of UOP or disclosed to the
UOP stockholders. 93 The court's reasoning with regard to each of these con-
siderations is based on Signal's fiduciary duty and the corresponding responsi-
bility of the Signal-nominated directors to disclose "'all information in their
possession germane to the transaction in issue.'" 94
Although the record taken as a whole seems to support the court's conclu-
sion that the transaction does not meet the requirements of fair dealing, any
inference that each of the individual factors considered alone is sufficient to
constitute a violation of the fair dealing requirement is inappropriate. First,
every parent-subsidiary merger is, by definition, initiated by the parent corpo-
ration. Second, that the transaction is completed within a short time 95 is not
significant if all other elements of the transaction are deemed fair.96 Third,
88. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711-12.
89. The Chancellor applied the Delaware block approach to valuation. This approach tradi-
tionally has been used in appraisal proceedings. Under the Delaware block approach, value is
determined using a weighted-average formula that considers market value, net asset value, and
investment or capitalized earnings value. After each of these elements of value is determined, the
Chancellor is required to assign a percentage weighting factor. The sum of each value times its
weighting factor is considered the appraisal value. For discussion of the Delaware block approach
and appraisal generally, see E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 372-97
(1972); Banks, Measuring the Value of Corporate Stock, 11 CAL. W.L. REv. 1 (1974); Lattin, Reme-
dies of Dissenting Sharehol der er A4pp raisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1931); Lattin,
Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 307 (1958); Levy, Rights o rDissenting Shareholders to Appraisal andtPament, 15 CORNELLL.Q. 420 (1930); Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L.R~v. 1453 (1966); Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. RnV. 629
(1977).
90. Weinberger II1, 457 A.2d at 712-15.91. Id. at 714.
92. Id. at 712.
93. Id. at 711-12.94. I  t 0 (quoting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.. 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977)).
95. The merger proposal was ratified and approved by UOP's board of directors four days
after the proposal was announced. The short period of time is unexplained because the proposalwas not resented to the stockholders until their next annual meeting on May 26, 1978, amost
three months after board approval. Id. at 706-707.
96. The length of time that a proposal is under consideration should not have any bearing onthe outcome of the case if the terms of the offer are fair. Although the short time allowed forconsideration of the transaction in this case is unexplained, all parties involved in the considera-tion of the offer were intimately familiar with UOP's business. See supra note 27.
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that negotiations in the sense of an offer and counteroffer were not conducted
is not surprising in a parent-subsidiary merger since the parent corporation's
offer is necessarily colored by the parent's awareness of its fiduciary duty.97
Finally, the feasibility study results are arguably of no consequence to the fair-
ness of the merger since the study concerned the benefits of the merger to
Signal, not UOP. 98
Two further observations regarding the majority stockholder's failure to
satisfy its fiduciary obligations must be noted. The court mistakenly implied
that the majority can satisfy its fiduciary duty by: establishing an artificial
independent negotiating structure,99 or by abstaining from any participation
in the transaction.°0 The fiduciary obligation of UOP's Signal-nominated di-
rectors, however, arose out of their relationship as directors of UOP 1'0 and
Signal's majority ownership, not out of the failure to establish an independent
bargaining group of outside directors or their participation in the negotiation
process. The most important element of the court's finding that the transac-
tion did not meet the fair-dealing standard, however, was the failure of Sig-
nal's UOP directors to notify the outside directors or UOP stockholders of the
results of their feasibility study.102 The court stated that, "with the well-estab-
lished Delaware law on the subject, and the Court of Chancery's findings of
fact here, it is inevitable that the obvious conflicts posed by Arledge and Chi-
tiea's preparation of their 'feasibility study,' derived from UOP information,
for the sole use and benefit of Signal, cannot pass muster."103 Thus, to the
extent that the court implied that "the result here could have been different if
UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside di-
rectors to deal with Signal at arm's length,"'104 or abstained from participating
in the consideration of the matter,' 05 the court's analysis is internally inconsis-
tent and contrary to the settled law of the fiduciary obligations of majority
97. See supra note 26. The trial court rejected plaintiffs allegations that no negotiations had
taken place. In so doing, the Chancellor interpreted "negotiations" in very broad terms, rather
than focusing on price offers and counteroffers. See Weinberger II, 426 A.2d at 1351-52. Finally,
in light of the majority stockholder status of Signal, the Chancellor recognized that Signal "could
not start at a price below that which it truly felt to be the fair value of UOP's shares and bargain
upward." Id. at 1354. Since Signal wore two hats as the majority shareholder of UOP and the
acquiring company, "it had to take care that it did not propose to pay more than was fair and
reasonable for the UOP shares." Id. In light of Signal's dual fiduciary duty to its stockholders
and the minority stockholders of UOP, it is not surprising that the only negotiations involved non-
price considerations like employee stock ownership and incentive plans as well as the assurance of
future employment for UOP's key personnel.
98. Seesu pra note 23. If, as the Weinberger 111 opinion suggests, a shareholder's sole interest
is in the value of his shares and he is thus relegated to an appraisal remedy, see infra notes 115-122
and accompanying text, then the results of the report are arguably of no interest to the UOP
shareholders.
99. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7.
100. Id. at 711.
101. See supra note 80.
102. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
103. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711.
104. Id. at 709-10 n.7.




The second aspect of the entire fairness standard is the requirement of
fair price.'0 7 The court concluded that the appropriate approach to valuing
the minority shares was the same as that in an appraisal proceeding.' 08 As
such, the resolution of the fair price aspect of entire fairness is dependent on
the court's new liberalized appraisal techniques.10 9 Since the Chancellor re-
jected the plaintiffs evidence as not "correspond[ing] with either logic or the
existing law,"' 110 the court concluded that "there can be no finding at the pres-
ent stage of these proceedings that the price is fair."' 'I
In rejecting the Chancellor's determination that the price offered by Sig-
nal was fair, the court declared that the long-standing Delaware block ap-
proach to valuation was "clearly outmoded,"' 12 and "[ilt is time we recognize
this in appraisal and other stock valuation proceedings and bring our law cur-
rent on the subject." ' 13 Furthermore, the court, after reviewing the legislative
history of the appraisal statute and the application of the remedy to take out
mergers, concluded that "the provisions of 8 Del. C § 262, as herein construed,
respecting the scope of an appraisal and the means for perfecting the same,
shall govern the financial remedy available to minority stockholders in a cash-
out merger." 114 Because of inconsistencies in the court's enumeration of the
minority stockholder's remedy and the court's misinterpretation of the appro-
priate elements of value that can be considered in an appraisal award, the
application of the appraisal remedy to take out mergers and its relationship to
the entire fairness test is uncertain.
The most obvious inconsistency in the court's analysis of the remedy
available to minority stockholders are the statements that "[w]hile a plaintiffs
monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized ap-
praisal proceeding herein established, we do not intend any limitation on the
historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief as the facts of a
particular case may dictate,"' 15 and "we return to the well established princi-
ples of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. ... and David J Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Industries, Inc.,. . . mandating a stockholder's recourse to the basic
106. See Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 711, for discussion of fiduciary obligations.
107. Id. at 711-15.
108. Id. at 712-15.
109, Id. at 712-13. The court concluded that the Delaware block approach to valuation was
clearly outmoded, noting that the discounted cash flow valuation method adopted by plaintiffs
financial expert was precisely the type of analysis employed in the Arledge-Chitiea report. "We
believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in
court .. " Id. at 713. This unexpected rejection of the long-standing Delaware block approach
appears to have been instigated by Justice Quillen. See supra note 83.
110. Weinberger 11, 426 A.2d at 1360.
111. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
112. Id. at 712.
113. Id See supra note 109.
114. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 715.
115. Id. at 714.
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remedy of an appraisal." 1 6 Since the court's rejection of the business purpose
test implicitly accepts the proposition that a stockholder's interest and right is
exclusively the value of his investment 1 7 and the liberalized appraisal remedy
is intended to "fully compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may
be,"' "18 there is no justification for the exercise of any of the Chancellor's in-
herent equitable powers. Furthermore, to the extent that a stockholder's inter-
est is solely value, there is no justification for consideration of fair dealing in
determining what remedy to apply. 19 Thus, the only conceivable interprett-
tion of the opinion that gives effect to the fair dealing requirement is that the
majority's failure to demonstrate that it has met the test of fair dealing will
invoke the inherent equitable powers of the Chancellor.120 This result is con-
trary to the generally accepted interpretation of the Stauffer and David J.
Greene & Co. 121 opinions cited as support for the proposition that a stock-
holder's recourse is the basic remedy of an appraisal. 122
In addition to this apparent contradiction, the Weinberger analysis of the
elements of value that may be considered in an appraisal proceeding 123 is
flawed. Although the court rejected the exclusive monetary formula enumer-
ated in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. ,124 the court concluded that value, de-
termined by taking into account all relevant factors, "includes the elements of
rescissory damages if the Chancellor considers them susceptible of proof.' 2 5
The rescissory damages standard in Lynch, 12 6 however, clearly includes ele-
116. Id. at 715.
117. In adopting the business purpose test, the Singer court rejected defendants' contention
that a stockholder's right is exclusively in the value of his investment.
At the core of defendants' contention is the premise that a shareholder's right is
exclusively in the value of his investment, not itsform. And, they argue, that right is
protected by a § 262 appraisal which, by definition, results in fair value for the shares.
This argument assumes that the right to take is coextensive with the power to take and
that a dissenting stockholder has no legally protected right in his shares, his certificate or
his company beyond a right to be paid fair value when the majority is ready to do this.
Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977-78 (1977). See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
This assumption regarding the nature of a stockholder's interest formed the theoretical foundation
for the business purpose test.
This implied rejection of the proposition that a stockholder has an interest in the form of his
investment is further supported by Weinberger's appraisal mandate. Since an appraisal proceed-
ing can only protect value, the Weinberger opinion ultimately rejects the stockholder's interest as a
stockholder.
118. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
119. See supra notes 80-106 and accompanying text.
120. The Chancellor's inherent equitable powers include rescission and injunctive relief. The
court's opinion does not provide any guidance concerning when these nonmonetary remedies
might be invoked.
121. David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
122. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 715. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 12.
124. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
125. Weinberger 111, 457 A.2d at 714.
126. In Lynch the court stated that rescission was not feasible since the merger had been ac-
complished long before the ultimate decision of the Delaware Supreme Court. The court con-
cluded, however, that a monetary equivalent of rescission was the proper remedy. "[A fair result
without requiring recission] can be accomplished by ordering damages which are the monetary
equivalent of rescission and which will, in effect, equal the increment in value that Vickers en-
joyed as a result of acquiring and holding the TransOcean stock in issue." Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
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ments of value that arise "from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger." 127
The Weinberger analysis obscures the underlying assumption of the ap-
praisal statute that a stockholder is "'entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.' "128
By focusing on subtle changes in the wording of section 262,129 the court con-
cluded that "[o]nly the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger are excluded."'130 If this con-
clusion is taken to its logical conclusion, however, the appraisal proceeding
would ensure that the real economic benefits commonly cited by the commen-
tators as the justification for mergers13 1 would be appropriated by the minority
stockholders. 132 Rather than take into account the "future prospects of the
merged corporation,"'133 the court's liberalized appraisal proceeding should
focus on the future prospects of the subsidiary corporation as a free-standing
going concern and attempt to ensure that the minority stockholders receive an
amount equal to their proportionate interest in this going concern. 134
The Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in Weinberger is marred by in-
ternal inconsistencies and by the failure to enunciate the assumptions underly-
ing its analysis. The court's disavowal of Singer's business purpose test is
based on the observation that the case law virtually interpreted the test's effect
out of existence. Given Singer's theoretical foundation, that a stockholder's
interest is not solely in the value of his shares, however, the rejection of the
business purpose test and the corresponding mandate that appraisal is a stock-
holder's exclusive remedy fundamentally alter the relationship between a
stockholder and the corporation. Such a conclusion is unwarranted in the ab-
sence of a thoughtful resolution of the public policies relating to mergers and
acquisitions and the unique factual situations in which these transactions can
arise.135 Because of the importance of the stability of the Delaware Supreme
Court's interpretation of Delaware corporate law, the Weinberger analysis and
127. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983). See supra note 12. The following simple exam-
ple illustrates this point. Corporation A, valued at $100 million, proposed to merge with corpora-
tion B, valued at $100 million. Corporation As financial advisors valued the hypothetical
corporation A and B at $300 million due to substantial economies of scale and other savings. If
the merger is later challenged and rescissory damages were awarded in the amount of $200 million
(the incremental value to corporation A), the minority stockholders of corporation B would clearly
be receiving value arising "from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."
128. Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch.
523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950)).
129. See id. at 713-14.
130. Id. at 713.
131. Numerous economic benefits have been cited by commentators as justification for merg-
ers. Some of the more commonly mentioned benefits include: (1) elimination of potential con-
fficts of interest between the parent and subsidiary corporation; (2) facilitation of long-term debt
financing; (3) tax benefits; (4) economies of scale; (5) improved mangement; and (6) prevention of
duplication of professional and other costs of services. See generally supra notes 2-4.
132. See supra note 127.
133. Weinberger II, 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch.
523, 526, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (1950)).
134. See Weinberger III, 457 A.2d at 713.
135. See supra note 3.
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the court's about-face on this issue are troublesome. Both the Delaware courts
and other state courts that are called upon to resolve this issue must scrutinize
the underlying policy implications of their decisions and explicitly state their
assumptions. This scrutiny will ensure a proper balance between the protec-
tion of stockholders' interests and the finality of corporate transactions.
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